it from behind, it is necessary to
install shock isolators between the
handler or driving wheel and the
machine structure. If supporting
an on-board operator, the seat must
also be isolated from shock waves
caused by explosions.
Another key issue in adapting agricultural technology to
Technical Survey is armoring. If
the machine is equipped in a way
that supports tools at the front, only
a light shield may be needed to protect the delicate parts. Otherwise, if
the machine is originally conceived
to support tools at the back, as is
frequently the case, then a system
to protect the undercarriage from
possible damage caused by the explosion of mines must be implemented. A good approach in this
case is to design special blast-resistant wheels that do not transmit the
shock associated with an explosion
to the chassis either by deforming flexibly or by releasing energy
through frictional pins. Research
on blast-resistant wheels, shock
isolators and modular remote-control systems, if flexible enough to
be adapted to different agricultural
machines, would benefit Technical
Survey processes enormously.

presence of landmines, assuming
that each one could have the same
productivity of one of the 21 machines used for area reduction in
2007 (around eight square kilometers [three square miles] per year),
the problem of landmines in BiH
could be potentially solved or drastically reduced to small, confined,
highly contaminated areas in less
than one year.
Conclusion
As under-developed countries
continue to be affected by the world
food crisis, the need for arable land
is increasing. Research into more
responsible agricultural practices is also becoming an imperative
to fight the dramatic consequences
of climate change. Investing in the
redesign of local agricultural technologies can both speed up mine
clearance and improve the future
for mine-affected countries by addressing these other challenges simultaneously. By approaching the
issue on a local instead of global
level, more appropriate, sustainable and reasonable solutions can
be achieved while fostering the empowerment of local populations.
See Endnotes, page 62

The Case of BiH

According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2008, 170
square kilometers (42,000 acres)
of land were released to public use through area reduction
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
2007, using 21 accredited demining machines.14 The estimated area
that still needs to be cleared consists of 1,738 square kilometers
(430,000 acres). If we look at the
number of agricultural tractors in
the country, approximately 30,000
units,15 and we imagine temporarily equipping 300 of them, i.e., 1
percent of all units available, with
low-cost ground-processing tools
and light armoring for assessing the
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Reflections from the Field: Lao PDR, Surveys
And Land Release
by Stephen Pritchard [ NPA–Laos and UXO Lao ]

With an example and a discussion of Norwegian People’s Aid’s work with UXO Lao in Lao
PDR, the author explains how choosing the right tasks and performing the tasks correctly
can allow land to be released safely and confidently.

I

n mid-September 2008, the Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Programme’s Operations and Quality
Management units joined a survey1 team in Khammouan, a province in the middle of the Laotian panhandle. A farmer had written a letter requesting the clearance
of unexploded ordnance for his land. It was a typical
dreary Indochinese afternoon at the end of the rainy season: muggy, drizzly, heavily rutted roads and crops at full
growth ready for harvest. Recent floods, the worst since
recording began in 1922, had devastated the agricultural
output of the Mekong basin. Fortunately, the farmer’s corn
crop was safe from the rising waters; his corn had avoided the fate of the thousands of acres of immature rice that
had fallen prey to the floods the previous month.

An Unusual Discovery
Looking at a map, one would assume that the farmer’s land would also be free from another common risk,
UXO. The nearest bombing was over five kilometers
(three miles) away and, although the available data is
incomplete and inaccurate, it generally gives a positive
correlation among accidents, contamination and poverty. UXO Lao’s management team at Tha Khaek, the provincial capital of Khammouan, thought this land would
have a negligible threat of UXO and suspected that the
farmer’s fear was based on vague “rumors” that circulated among the locals.
On meeting with the survey team, the farmer pointed out the boundaries of the land and explained why
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Beneficiaries matter. Land release re-distributees limited clearance capacity: It’s not
just about reducing polygons using a checklist.

Farmers in Lao PDR regularly find “bombies” in fields that have been used for several years.

he thought it should be cleared. He had found a large
piece of sharp metal and assumed it was fragmentation from a piece of UXO. When questioned by the survey team, however, the farmer admitted that the land
around his was in use; he did not know of any ground
fighting that took place in the area; and he had used
this plot of land for 10 years without finding UXO.
There were no credible indicators of ground battles
or bombing besides the single fragment of metal. We all
agreed that full clearance would be wasteful and believed
the farmer simply needed a team to “check his land” as
a confidence-building measure. The visit of the survey
team in itself increased his confidence in using the land,
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X marks the spot: A “bombie” lies near a fruit plantation. Five years ago, many clearance
tasks were yielding no UXO.

and a follow-up Technical Survey was scheduled for the
2009 work plan.
Surveys
Considering the requirement by most donors
for using funds effectively, the solution should have
been land release by Non-technical Survey, which is
different from the solution chosen above. The planned
Technical Survey visit by a team wielding detectors
would not affect the farmer’s use of the land because
he was already using the land. At the time, UXO Lao
had yet to adopt land release by Non-technical Survey
(adopted in 2009).

In the past year, I have joined several such surveys
with UXO Lao. In most cases, the need for full clearance
is beyond question. There are, however, occasional
requests for the threat level requires clarification
by Technical Survey or which no further action is
required. This depends on the land user’s willingness
to accept the decision, as the goal of land release is to
instill confidence that land is safe for use based on a
thorough assessment. Technical Survey and clearance
are more productively directed toward situations in
which UXO contamination is highly suspected.
Major international nongovernmental organizations, such as The HALO Trust, have made significant

inroads into reducing “exaggerated” contamination
records using sensible field survey and database review. Across the humanitarian sector in general, such
credible efforts have tended to be in isolation; most
surveys have focused on capturing all Suspected Hazardous Areas.
Lao PDR is different—there is no comprehensive
database of polygons.2 The raw contamination data is
based on 40-year-old U.S. Air Force bombing records,
the accuracy of which is mediocre at best, given
the technological limits at the time of the fighting.
The original Landmine Impact Survey conducted
by Handicap International in 1997 has never been
followed by a comprehensive attempt to measure or
record UXO contamination. Despite the stipulations
in Article IV of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,
which Lao PDR has signed and ratified, no such effort
is planned. Perhaps the condition of the databases in
other mine-affected countries serves to dissuade rather
than encourage “baseline survey.” The sheer quantity
and impact of bombing and ground fighting in Lao
PDR far exceeds that of most other countries.
Land Release
Land release is the process of changing the status of
known or Suspected Hazardous Areas to released land
using Non-technical Survey, Technical Survey and/or
clearance in the most relevant, effective and efficient
manner. Land can be released within a former SHA
by gathering sufficient information to confirm the absence of mines or UXO in the area with a high degree
of certainty and, therefore, recommending that suspicion of mines/UXO should no longer prevent the local
population from using the land. The concept of land
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release emerged because many clearance operators
constitute a relatively expensive and time-consuming
clearance capacity for land with limited or no mines
or UXO. In many cases, the original data reflected
the best information and tools available at the time.
Subsequent reviews after years of increased land use
and shifting indigenous attitude regarding risk and
mine-action activity changed the perception of these
recorded areas. In other cases, an inaccurate original
survey is blamed for over-stating the contamination;
land release has generally resulted in the reduction of
land requiring expensive area clearance. If someone
suspects land is contaminated, we have to do something but not always clearance. Non-primary clearance tools such as machines and canines are also used
as land-release methods.
While land release in itself is not a new concept, incorporating it as a national policy including survey is
new. Land release by clearance has been the only available response option in many countries, including Laos
until 2007. Though commercial organizations have applied land-release methodology for decades in their
own operations, only recently has it been recognized
by some host governments. The notions of a consistent
methodology and thresholds of risk tolerance certainly
are only just emerging in several countries, even those
with long-established mine-action programs. The challenge facing the sector is to make sure it does the right
job, without adding extra layers of confusion.
Government and Clearance in Laos
Broadly speaking, clearance in Laos is reactive rather than proactive. Some international NGOs and companies conduct their own prioritization, and most work
for clients or development partners who are risk-averse
and restrictive in the services they will pay for. At the
operational level, task perimeters are defined by consensus between survey teams and those who request
clearance. However, this will not capture contaminated areas adjacent to the area presented for clearance.
As shown in the above example of the farmer with
one piece of metal on his land, records have shown
that some of these requested areas have had no contamination at all. Under such a client-driven system,
the prioritization process is (arguably) participatory;
however, the effectiveness of the work is at the mercy
of the requests.
The biggest threats to effective land release, as with
clearance, are maintaining consistent management
focus and resources. Without adequate resourcing,
there will not be sufficient monitoring of field activity to
ensure effective land release. The “great idea” purported
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by land release is relegated to a well-meaning paper
exercise. Without good activity and policy, release by
the wrong means may occur. Land release alone is
no substitute for a well-supported, sensibly-recruited
and sustained management with good “field time,” as
well as administrative competence. A dedicated staff
is needed to visit the field, review decisions and ask,
“Are we doing the right job, the right way?” The good
news is that the cost of maintaining such capacities
is, in the long run, dwarfed by the cost of ineffective
solutions to seemingly endless polygons or “dodgy
requests.” The need for consistent oversight of field
operations increases with organization size. In UXO
Lao’s case, with 960 staff, a strong central “ownership”
of operational policies is important.
Recognizing the need to encourage reform, the
United Nations Development Programme, NPA and
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining began to collaborate on two main projects.
In 2005, NPA and UXO Lao conducted a study called
“Enhancing the Technical Survey.” This led to the Enhanced Technical Survey project, aimed at supporting
UXO Lao as it embraced effective land release. The first
step was to introduce a Technical Survey that would
discourage full clearance if no UXO was found. Secondly, a revised Non-technical Survey was devised to
enable land release in the rare cases in which there
were no indicators and also to provide baseline data
for post-clearance assessment. (Both were absent before: UXO Lao was literally a clearance agency.) At the
national level, GICHD developed a risk model to support consistent land-release decisions by clearance operators. Both projects, although technical rather than
cross-cutting, resulted in a sustained management focus on selection of UXO area-clearance tasks. Between
1999 and 2004, a sample of 2,000 records showed only
two-thirds of UXO Lao’s area-clearance tasks yielded any UXO; by 2007 and 2008, over 98 percent did.
The positive implications for aid effectiveness are obvious—UXO Lao is the largest recipient of bilateral donor funding in Lao PDR and is a significant recipient of
multilateral resources. This does not signify that a perfect land-release model has been bequeathed to UXO
Lao by a handful of international advisers; it shows
those precious resources are now having a considerable impact. UXO Lao has come a long way in using donations wisely, especially in the past four years.
Tolerance
The periodic review of risk-tolerance thresholds is
important. “Targets” must be avoided. Land-release
performance is not measured in square meters but in

the quality of the decisions. Right
now, the tolerance-to-action correlation for UXO is:
If there is reliable, first-hand
evidence of UXO in or immediately around the land, or
in the land where an accident
occurred, the land is subject
to clearance.
If there are rumors of UXO,
accidents, battles, military
positions or bombings in or
around the land, Technical
Survey is applied.
If there are no indicators, the
land is released following a
Non-technical Survey.
The above thresholds cannot
capture and account for every
eventuality. For instance, what if
UXO in the land was not in situ?
What if there are gaps in released
bombing data? What if nobody is
available who was in the area during the war? Thankfully, UXO Lao
employs staff with 15 years of operational experience. It is arrogant
to assume that they would not be
able to consider such practicalities, and I have every confidence
that they usually make the right
decision. However, these decisions
have to be reviewed consistently
and with a self-critical eye to ensure effectiveness.

·

·
·

Conclusion
This tale is not a complete success story; it is ongoing. Enabling
our national counterparts to adopt
a new attitude toward risk—and a
significant change in the way decisions have traditionally been
approached—is not easy in the
West, let alone in Lao PDR, which
has seen decades of inconsistent,
and occasionally incompetent, foreign assistance. The capability gap
of nationally-owned operational analysis, maintenance of standards and monitoring presents a
significant constraint to the ef-

fective application of land-release
concepts. Finally, many of these
improvements have been driven
by several foreigners who have put
it on themselves to encourage our
counterparts to adopt a seemingly alien policy. This is a policy that
puts their heads, rather than Technical Advisors’ heads, on the block
for key decisions. I can see why it
has taken some time to implement
this, but in the long run, it will be
worth it.
GICHD, UNDP and NPA have
invested time, effort and generous
donor resources into encouraging
land-release policy. Different methods have been employed and the end
result has been a sustained focus on
sound risk management and effectiveness of clearance work. UXO
Lao now has a policy of land release
consisting of not only clearance but
Technical and Non-technical Survey. The methodology incorporates
the GICHD risk model as well as
elements of NPA’s project formerly
known as Enhanced Technical Survey. Ideally, it will be used consistently and sensibly. Realistically, its
success depends on many factors,
some of which seem unlikely to be
fulfilled in the immediate future.
NPA has decided to end its landrelease support project with UXO
Lao. In some measures, the project already achieved its goals and in
others, there remain roadblocks to
its success. But the 80/20 rule3 applies, and international agencies are
not here to substitute for national
leadership. So on this cheerful, yet
imperfect note, UXO Lao will take
the baton in this relay. The race will
never really be over, but that baton
has finally changed hands.
See Endnotes, page 62
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